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Abstract
A series of empirical studies has documented that job search behavior depends on the -
nancial situation of the unemployed. Starting from this observation, we ask how unem-
ployment insurance policy should take the individual nancial situation into account. We
use a quantitative model with a realistically calibrated unemployment insurance system,
individual consumption-saving decision and moral hazard during job search to answer this
question. We nd that the optimal policy provides unemployment benets that increase
with individual assets. By implicitly raising interest rates, asset-increasing benets encour-
age self-insurance, which facilitates consumption smoothing during unemployment but does
not exacerbate moral hazard for job search. Asset-increasing benets also have desirable
properties from a dynamic perspective, because they emulate key features of the dynamics
of constrained ecient allocations. We nd welfare gains from introducing asset-increasing
benets that are substantial and amount to 1:5% of consumption when comparing steady
states and 0:8% of consumption when taking transition costs into account. More generous
replacement rates or benets targeted to asset-poor households, by contrast, have a negative
eect on welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper starts from the empirical observation that job search behavior depends on the
nancial situation of the unemployed. For instance, Silvio (2006), Card, Chetty, and Weber
(2007), and Lentz (2009) document that higher asset holdings prolong job search, and Chetty
(2008) nds that job seekers in nancially worse situations react more strongly to changes in the
unemployment insurance (UI) system. Motivated by these ndings, we ask how the UI system
should optimally take the individual nancial situation into account. We answer this question
using a quantitative model with a realistically calibrated UI program, individual consumption-
saving decision, and moral hazard during job search.
We nd that the optimal UI system provides benets that increase with individual assets.
The welfare gain of this system over the optimal asset-independent one is sizable and amounts
to 1:5 percent of consumption when comparing steady states, and 0:8 percent of consumption
when taking transition costs into account. Intuitively, an asset-increasing benet scheme is
preferable to an asset-independent one, because it enhances precautionary savings during em-
ployment and thereby allows additional consumption smoothing during unemployment without
worsening moral hazard. By contrast, additional insurance coming from higher replacement
rates or benets targeted to asset-poor households has a negative eect on welfare, because
such systems crowd out self-insurance and exacerbate moral hazard by distorting the returns
to job search. Furthermore, from a dynamic perspective, asset-increasing benets improve the
insurance-incentive trade-o by exploiting the information about past search eort inherent in
the accumulated asset stock. A high asset stock signals short unemployment durations in the
past, and the optimal policy rewards such histories by paying higher benets in case the agent
becomes unemployed in the present.
Due to the complexity of the government's problem in this setup, we refrain from a charac-
terization of the second best allocation and follow the large strand of the literature that uses
calibrated models to study the optimal policy for a restricted class of policy instruments (Ram-
sey optimal policy).1 We build an incomplete markets model in which workers are randomly
laid o and exert unobservable eort to inuence their chances of nding a job. Workers ac-
cumulate or decumulate a risk-free asset during employment and unemployment subject to a
1See Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Wang and Williamson (2002), and Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu, and Sahin
(2002), for example.
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borrowing constraint. The asset distribution is thus endogenous and depends, in particular,
on the structure of the UI system. To keep the analysis tractable, we restrict attention to UI
systems that condition only on asset holdings, but not directly on the employment history.2
Although potentially restrictive, such systems already achieve sizable welfare gains.
In the quantitative analysis we put strong discipline on the model's parameters. We calibrate
the model to match the empirical evidence for U.S. job nding and job loss rates, as well as
the asset holdings of displaced workers (Gruber, 2001), the estimated change in marginal utility
during unemployment (Chetty, 2008), and the elasticity of the job nding rate with respect
to the replacement rate (Krueger and Meyer, 2002). Starting from the calibrated benchmark
economy we proceed in two steps. In the rst step, we show that optimizing the replacement
rate of the UI system leads to negligible welfare gains relative to the benchmark system. This
nding is in line with results by Chetty (2008), who using a dierent model and approach also
nds that the current U.S. system is close to optimal in terms of the replacement rate. In
the second step, we go beyond asset-independent UI systems and explore simple parametric
functional forms of asset tests. We maximize social welfare over a large parameter space and
show that substantial welfare improvements are possible if asset-increasing UI benets replace
the current asset-independent system.3 The gains remain large even when we take the transition
towards the higher steady state asset stock into account. We also show that additional asset
heterogeneity generated by heterogeneous time discount factors does not alter the result that
asset-increasing benets are optimal.
The reason for the optimality of asset-increasing benets becomes apparent once we distin-
guish between the two purposes of UI, namely providing liquidity in situations without income
and encouraging job search (Chetty, 2008; Shimer and Werning, 2008). The rst step of our
analysis shows that additional liquidity from more generous UI benets does not improve wel-
fare, because this crowds out self-insurance and worsens the moral hazard problem, so that
agents substitute from search eort towards leisure. Hence, a welfare gain requires to generate
additional liquidity without imposing further distortions on the returns to job search. Asset-
2For simplication, we assume that assets are observable for the UI agency without costs. How costly it is
to monitor asset holdings in practice remains an open question. Yet, the fact that asset-tested social transfer
programs are widespread throughout the world suggests that the costs of verifying asset holdings are somewhat
limited. Furthermore, under the optimal UI system in our model agents have no incentive to underreport assets,
but only to overreport, and the latter is probably a lot easier to detect.
3The functional forms also allow for transfers targeted to the asset-poor, i.e. benets that decrease with assets.
We show that asset-decreasing benets lead to welfare losses.
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increasing UI benets are a simple tool to achieve this goal, since they implicitly raise the rate
of return on assets and thereby encourage self-insurance while keeping the average generosity
of transfers unchanged. This generates extra liquidity via private asset accumulation without
changing the average level of benets, which means that, loosely speaking, there is no loss of
publicly provided liquidity and no increase in moral hazard on average.
In addition to the welfare gain from improved liquidity provision, asset-increasing benet
schemes create a number of desirable eects highlighted in the literature on optimal dynamic
contracts. As the agent's asset stock tends to fall during unemployment and grow during em-
ployment, the asset stock can be interpreted as a summary statistic of the agent's employment
history. Hence, when benets increase with assets, the duration of present and past unem-
ployment spells has a negative impact on the generosity of public transfers. This property is
commonly found to be optimal in the dynamic contracting literature, see Shavell and Weiss
(1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009). Similarly, since asset-increasing benet systems
enhance precautionary savings, the magnitude of asset accumulation and decumulation tends
to be larger than for asset-independent UI systems. This has again favorable dynamic conse-
quences, since consumption after re-employment then decreases more strongly with the duration
of previous unemployment spells, which generates larger `re-employment taxes' in the sense of
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst that delivers an analysis of asset-tested UI
in a model with endogenous asset accumulation. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and
Williamson (2002) use quantitative models similar to ours to study optimal UI systems without
asset-tests. While Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) explore to what extent optimal replacement
rates vary with the degree of moral hazard, Wang and Williamson (2002) investigate the eect
of dynamic benets and experience rating for employers.
In line with the work by Rendahl (2011), our results point out the importance of individual
asset holdings as a state for UI policy. Yet, due to key dierences in modeling assumptions,
we reach very dierent conclusions on how this state should be used. Rendahl (2011) stud-
ies asset-dependent UI in a model with a single unemployed agent who experiences a single
unemployment spell. In this setup, the distribution of assets at job loss is exogenous and ho-
mogeneous by assumption, and therefore the UI system has no eect on precautionary savings
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behavior. Moreover, assets include no information on the agent's history prior to the current
unemployment spell. These peculiarities of the single spell model seem to matter a lot for the
results: Rendahl (2011) nds that optimal unemployment benets decrease with assets, while
we conclude the opposite.
Finally, our results are related to the work by Shimer and Werning (2008), who study
the optimal timing of UI benets in a single-spell model of unemployment where agents have
access to a savings technology. They nd that UI systems with a simple, time-independent
replacement rate are very close to optimal in this environment. Our results show that when
asset accumulation prior to job loss and multiple unemployment spells are taken into account,
this result no longer applies and large welfare gains are possible by moving to less restrictive UI
systems.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model. We describe our cal-
ibration, solve for the optimal policy and present the results in Section 3. Section 4 provides
some discussion and a sensitivity analysis of the results. We provide conclusions in Section 5.
2 Model
There is a continuum of mass 1 of ex ante identical agents. At each date t 2 f0; 1; : : : ;1g,
the agent's employment state t is an element of the set  = fE;U; Sg, where E stands for
employment, U for unemployment, and S for social assistance. Employment states are stochastic
and transition probabilities between states depend on the (unobservable) eort exerted by the
agent. If the agent exerts eort et and is in state  at time t, then her probability of being in
state 0 in period t+ 1 is denoted by
Prob
 
t+1 = 
0 j t = ; et

= 0(et):
In each period, the agent derives utility u(ct) from consumption ct and disutility (et) from
eort et, where u : R+ ! R is strictly increasing and strictly concave and  : R+ ! R is
strictly increasing and (weakly) convex. Given prices (r; w), discount factor  2 (0; 1), utility
functions u and , and the above specication of uncertainty, the agent chooses a consumption
sequence fctg1t=0, a sequence of asset holdings fat+1g1t=0, and a sequence of eort levels fetg1t=0
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to maximize expected discounted life-time utility:
max
fct;at+1;etg
E
" 1X
t=0
t (u(ct)  (et))
#
(1)
s.t. ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + y(at; t)
at+1  a; ct  0; et  0
a0; 0 given
where y(at; t) denotes the agent's income in period t, r is the return on assets between periods
t and t+ 1, and a  0 represents a borrowing constraint.
If the agent is employed (t = E), she receives a wage w and pays proportional income taxes
at rate  . In state t = U , she receives unemployment benets b(at). Finally, in state t = S the
agent is unemployed and receives social assistance transfers z. The agent's income (excluding
interest income) in period t is hence given by
y(at; t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  )w if t = E;
b(at) if t = U;
z if t = S:
The government provides unemployment benets and social assistance benets and levies a
proportional tax  on labor income. Unemployment benets b(a) may depend on the agent's
current asset position a, while social assistance benets z are asset-independent for simplicity.
The government runs a balanced budget in each period, i.e., the government policy must satisfy
w
Z
at
dt(at; E) =
Z
at
b(at)dt(at; U) + z
Z
at
dt(at; S) 8t (2)
where t denotes the distribution of agents over asset holdings A = [a;1) and employment
states  = fE;U; Sg at time t.
The general setup of the model is not accessible for a quantitative analysis. We will therefore
make some standard assumptions on functional forms.
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Assumption 1. The agent's period utility function is given by
u(c)  (e) =
8><>: (1  )

c1 
1    e

;  6= 1;   1;
(1  ) (log(c)  e) ;  = 1;   1:
Since empirical knowledge on the extent to which workers can inuence their layo risk is
very limited, we will model layos as exogenous.4 In addition, we assume that the job search
technology of the agent is the same during social assistance and unemployment benet receipt.
Assumption 2. Transition probabilities from employment to employment (EE) are independent
of the agent's eort:
EE(e) = EE ;
with EE > 0. Transition probabilities from unemployment to employment (UE) and from social
assistance to employment (SE) depend on eort in the following way:
UE(e) = 1  exp(  e); SE(e) = 1  exp(  e):
To economize on the number of state variables, we assume that the duration of unemploy-
ment benets is stochastic.5 An agent who received unemployment benets at time t   1 and
continues to be unemployed at time t will receive unemployment benets with probability p
and social assistance transfers with probability 1   p. By contrast, an unemployed agent who
received social assistance transfers at time t   1 and continues to be unemployed at time t
will receive social assistance transfers (and no unemployment benets) with certainty. We will
later choose p = 5=6, which means that unemployed agents, in expectation, have access to
unemployment benets during the rst 6 months of their spell.
Combining these functional forms with the above rules for UI eligibility gives rise to the
4From a technical point of view, introducing layo probabilities that depend on eort would not be dicult.
However, in such a setup wealthy workers would ceteris paribus lose their job more often than poor ones. As a
consequence, the asset distribution of job losers would dominate that of employed workers, which is contradicted
by the ndings from Gruber (2001). The fact that wealth matters for transitions from unemployment to employ-
ment, on the other hand, is well-established empirically. Silvio (2006) and Lentz (2009), among others, document
that wealthier individuals ceteris paribus take longer to nd a job. Our model will endogenously generate this
feature.
5By making the duration of unemployment benets stochastic, we substantially reduce the computational
complexity of the problem, but nonetheless capture the fact that benets are paid for a limited time only. If the
duration of unemployment benets were deterministic, we would have to introduce the current duration of an
unemployed's spell as an additional state variable.
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following matrix of transition probabilities over states (E;U; S):
0BBBB@
EE 1  EE 0
1  exp(  e) exp(  e)p exp(  e) (1  p)
1  exp(  e) 0 exp(  e)
1CCCCA (3)
where the rst, second, and third row contain the transition probabilities for an agent in state
E, U , and S, respectively.
The following assumption allows us to solve the agent's decision problem using rst-order
conditions.6
Assumption 3. Unemployment benets b(a) are dierentiable on [a;1).
2.1 Equilibrium
Recall  = fE;U; Sg and denote the asset space by A = [a;1). The agent's problem has
a recursive structure and we restrict attention to recursive policies from now on. We adopt
standard notation and denote current period's variables without time subscript and next period's
variables by a prime, e.g.  and 0 for the employment state in the current and the next period.
The agent's Bellman equation reads
v(a; ) = max
fa0;eg
u((1 + r)a+ y(a; )  a0)  (e) + 
X
02
v(a0; 0)0(e) (4)
s.t. e  0; a0  a; (1 + r)a+ y(a; )  a0  0:
A (recursive) steady state equilibrium consists of a value function v : A   ! R, an asset
policy function a0 : A! R+, an eort policy function e : A! R, a government policy
(b(); z; ) and an invariant distribution  on the state space A such that:
1. v, a0, and e solve the agent's problem (1) given prices (w; r) and the government policy.
2. The government's budget constraint (2) is satised.
3.  is an invariant distribution given decision functions e; a0 and transition matrix (3).
6Our approach relies on the agent's decision problem being concave, which we verify numerically.
8
3 Results
We take a model period to be one month. We normalize the wage rate to 1 and set the interest
rate to match an annual return on assets of 4%. The parameters  and EE are chosen to
replicate the average job nding and job loss rate in the United States in the period from 1980
to 2005.7 The target for  is median assets (gross nancial wealth) of newly displaced workers
reported by Gruber (2001). For reasons specied below, we set the parameters of the agent's
utility function to  = 2,  = 1. The benchmark UI policy consists of an asset-independent
replacement rate of 0:5, b(a) = 0:5(1   )w, which represents the average replacement rate
currently eective in the United States.8 Social assistance benets z are chosen according to the
average transfer received by a single adult with no children in the 60th month of unemployment
in the U.S., which gives z = 0:08(1  )w.9 The tax rate is  = 0:0211 and is set to balance the
government's budget.
The calibration generates the following parameters: EE = 0:9855,  = 0:0472,  = 0:974.
With these parameters, the steady state equilibrium matches the calibration targets as shown
in Table 1. The corresponding consumption and eort decisions can be found in Figure 1.
Table 1: Calibration
model target
job nding rate 27:0% 27:0%
job loss rate 1:5% 1:5%
median assets of job losers 1:2 1:2
Notes: Calibration result. The rst column gives the data target, the second column the model predicted
value of the data target, and the third column the empirical value of the calibration target. The sources
for the empirical values of the data targets are given in the main text.
Our choice of the coecient of relative risk aversion,  = 2, turns out to be well in line
with the relative change in marginal utility during unemployment estimated by Chetty (2008).
7The rates are derived using monthly worker ows from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for all workers
aged 16 years and older from 1980 to 2005. Details are available upon request.
8According to the OECD, the net replacement rate during the rst six months of unemployment in the U.S. in
2009 amounts to 0.49. This number is calculated for single persons with no children and averaged over three
stylized pre-unemployment income levels. See www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/21/49021188.xlsx for further details.
9The social assistance level of 0:08 is the net replacement rate in the 60th month of unemployment in the
U.S. in 2009, calculated for single persons with no children and averaged over three stylized pre-unemployment
income levels. See www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/19/49021050.xlsx for further details. Benets include social
assistance (SNAP) and housing benets.
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Consider the expression
u0
 
cU
  u0  cE
u0 (cU )
(5)
where cE denotes consumption during employment and cU represents consumption when receiv-
ing UI benets. We compute this expression by comparing the consumption levels of employed
and unemployed agents with identical asset positions. We then average over asset holdings,
putting weights according to the asset distribution of the unemployed. While Chetty estimates
(a dynamic version of) expression (5) to be roughly 0:6, our model generates a number of 0.64.
To check the plausibility of the eort cost parameter,  = 1, we examine the elasticity of
the job nding rate with respect to UI benets. Intuitively, the higher the convexity of eort
costs, the smaller is the reaction of eort to changes in benet generosity. With  = 1, at the
benchmark UI system the elasticity of the job nding rate with respect to the replacement rate
is approximately 0:48.10 This number is closely in line with the results by Chetty (2008), who
estimates an elasticity of 0:53. Most estimates surveyed by Krueger and Meyer (2002) fall into
a similar range.
3.1 Asset-independent UI
We now hold the parameters of the model xed and vary the replacement rate of the UI system,
while adapting the tax rate to keep the government budget balanced. Table 2 displays mean
asset holdings, unemployment, taxes and welfare for the steady state equilibria associated with
various replacement rates. We also report the utilitarian welfare gain relative to the benchmark
policy, expressed in terms of equivalent variation of consumption of the benchmark economy.
Using utilitarian steady state welfare as our criterion, the optimal replacement rate is 40
percent. The welfare gain relative to the benchmark policy is negligible, however, as steady
state welfare raises by only 0.02 percent in consumption equivalent terms. The benchmark
replacement rate of 50 percent is hence very close to optimal.
The benchmark government policy yields a substantial welfare increase relative to autarky.
Table 3 shows the welfare eects of eliminating unemployment insurance and/or social assis-
tance. Relative to the benchmark policy, autarky (no UI, no social assistance) entails steady
state welfare losses of 0.64 percent in consumption equivalent terms.
10More precisely, a ten percent increase in the replacement rate (from 0:5 to 0:55) reduces the job nding rate
of agents receiving UI benets by roughly 4.8 percent in our model (from 0:2233 to 0:2125).
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Table 2: Steady states for various asset-independent replacement rates
replacement assets unemployment tax welfare change
80% 0.73 6.2% 3.9% -0.38%
70% 0.84 5.8% 3.2% -0.18%
60% 0.98 5.4% 2.6% -0.06%
50% 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
40% 1.31 4.8% 1.6% 0.02%
30% 1.53 4.6% 1.2% 0.00%
20% 1.78 4.4% 0.8% -0.03%
Notes: Results of varying the replacement rate starting from the benchmark economy. Column 1 gives
the dierent replacement rates, column 2 the average asset holdings in the economy, column 3 the
unemployment rate, column 4 the tax rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed as equivalent
variation in steady state consumption generated by moving from the benchmark economy to the economy
with the new replacement rate.
Table 3: Steady states for the benchmark policy, no UI, no social assistance, and autarky
policy assets unemployment tax welfare change
benchmark 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
no social assistance 1.35 4.6% 1.9% -0.35%
no UI 2.50 4.1% 0.1% -0.25%
autarky 2.56 3.8% 0.0% -0.64%
Notes: Results of eliminating unemployment insurance benets, social assistance benets, or both. The
rst column describes the policy experiment, column 2 gives the average asset holdings in the economy,
column 3 the unemployment rate, column 4 the tax rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed as
equivalent variation in steady state consumption.
3.2 Linear asset-dependent UI
We now allow UI benets b(a) to depend on assets, holding the tax rate  = 0:0211 xed at
the benchmark level.11 For now, we restrict ourselves to systems where the replacement rate
depends on assets in a linear way,
b(a)
(1  )w = 1a+ 2: (6)
We explore various slopes 1 and choose the intercept 2 to preserve budget balance. Recall
that the social assistance replacement rate is set to 0.08. We therefore allow for intercept values
2 2 [0:08; 1].
Table 4 shows that steady state welfare increases in 1, the slope of the benet scheme. We
11We also explored asset-dependent benets for alternative tax rates. The results are very similar to the ones
reported for  = 0:0211. Moreover, this tax rate is approximately optimal. See Appendix A for further details.
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Table 4: Steady states for linear asset-dependent replacement rates
1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
-0.150 0.615 0.57 4.7% -0.88%
-0.100 0.590 0.72 4.8% -0.62%
-0.050 0.553 0.89 4.9% -0.33%
0.000 0.500 1.13 5.1% 0.00%
0.050 0.419 1.47 5.3% 0.38%
0.100 0.283 2.02 5.7% 0.86%
0.138 0.084 2.83 6.1% 1.34%
Notes: Results for replacement rates that are linear in assets. The rst column gives the slope of the
replacement rate with respect to assets, column 2 the intercept, column 3 the average asset holdings in
the economy, column 4 the unemployment rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed as equivalent
variation in steady state consumption generated by moving from the benchmark economy to the economy
with asset-dependent replacement rates. The tax rate  = 0:0211 is xed at the benchmark level.
note that the potential welfare gain of linking benets linearly to assets corresponds to roughly
1.3 percent of steady state consumption. This gain is more than twice as large as the gain of
moving the economy from autarky to the benchmark policy. In addition, we nd that systems
where benets decrease with assets (the conventional denition of an asset test) bring welfare
losses compared to the benchmark system with asset-independent benets. The optimal linear
asset-dependent UI system is given by parameters 1 = 0:138, 2 = 0:084. These parameters
are at the corner. If we increase the slope 1 even further, it becomes impossible to nd an
intercept 2 2 [0:08; 1] such that the government budget is balanced.
Under the optimal linear asset-dependent system, agents with zero assets face a replacement
rate equal to that under social assistance. For the median job loser, having assets of around 3.1,
the replacement rate equals 50 percent during the rst month of unemployment. Figure 2 shows
the shape of UI benets under this system. Figure 3 displays the corresponding consumption
decisions and job nding probabilities.
For technical reasons, benet schemes that increase with assets generate higher unemploy-
ment rates than schemes with asset-independent or asset-decreasing benets. This is simply a
peculiarity of our policy experiment. Recall that we x the tax rate, which implies that the
amount of government transfers is approximately the same for all policies. Since asset-increasing
UI systems implicitly subsidize pre-cautionary saving and thereby raise steady state asset hold-
ings, the total amount of resources available during unemployment is higher for those systems.
Quite straightforwardly, job nding rates are thus lower. It would not be dicult to reduce the
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tax rate and the average level of benets such that the job nding rate of the asset-increasing
UI system matches the rate of the benchmark policy. Appendix A shows that this does not
yield higher welfare.
3.3 Nonlinear asset-dependent UI
We now consider a more exible functional form for UI benets. This allows us to locally
increase the slope of benets even further than in the experiments conducted above. Given that
the optimal linear benet function was the one that had the highest possible slope subject to
obtaining budget balance, there might be room for a further welfare improvement.
Since asset-decreasing benet schemes lead to welfare losses in the linear case, we restrict
ourselves to a class of increasing functions,
b(a)
(1  )w = 1  0:92 exp

  (a=2)1

; (7)
where 1; 2 are positive parameters. The class of functions in (7) includes S-shaped and concave
benet schemes, as well as schemes that are approximately linear over some range. Intuitively,
the slope parameter 1 determines the sensitivity of benets as we move from the center of the
asset distribution to the tails. Notice that benets exceed the social assistance level of 0.08 and
are bounded above by 1 for all parameter values.
We examine dierent values for 1 and choose 2 to ensure that the government budget
is balanced. Table 5 shows the results of various parameter values for this functional form.
Figure 4 displays the shape of UI benets under the optimal parameters, while Figure 5 shows
the corresponding consumption function and optimal job nding probabilities. The steady
state welfare gain relative to the benchmark policy is substantial and amounts to an equivalent
variation of 1.56 percent of period consumption. Yet, this gain is only slightly larger than the
one obtained by the optimal linear benet system. Besides, we nd that steeper slopes of the
benet function are not necessarily better. For functions with parameter values 1 higher than
the optimal level, 1 = 2, the slope of benets at the mean of the asset distribution is steeper
(and mean asset holdings are higher), but steady state welfare is lower.
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Table 5: Steady states for various nonlinear asset-dependent replacement rates
1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
1.0 4.378 2.50 5.9% 1.16%
1.5 4.500 3.04 6.2% 1.43%
2.0 4.815 3.48 6.5% 1.56%
2.5 5.200 3.56 6.7% 1.06%
Notes: Results for various asset-dependent replacement rates using the functional form described in
equation (7). The rst two columns display the parameter values, column states 3 the average asset
holdings in the economy, column 4 the unemployment rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed
as equivalent variation in steady state consumption generated by moving from the benchmark economy to
the economy with asset-dependent replacement rates. The tax rate  = 0:0211 is xed at the benchmark
level.
4 Discussion
The quantitative results from the previous section have shown that linking the UI replacement
rate to individual assets generates a substantial welfare gain relative to asset-independent sys-
tems. Most importantly, we have found that the replacement rate should be an increasing
function of assets.
The economic forces behind this result become straightforward once we dierentiate between
the moral hazard eect and the liquidity eect of UI. As emphasized by Chetty (2008), UI
programs play two very distinct roles.12 On the one hand, they narrow the income gap between
employment and unemployment. This distorts the relative price between work and leisure, and
results in moral hazard so that unemployed workers substitute from search eort towards leisure.
On the other hand, UI programs alleviate borrowing constraints by raising the worker's wealth
during unemployment. This second channel, referred to as the liquidity eect, also leads to a
reduction in search eort. Although both the liquidity and the moral hazard eect inuence
the agent's search behavior in a similar direction, the welfare consequences are very dierent.
Liquidity provision is a socially benecial response to credit market imperfection, while the
moral hazard eect resulting from the price distortion is detrimental to social welfare.
Ideally, a UI program should generate liquidity without generating moral hazard. In a
model with endogenous asset accumulation, the UI system aects the liquidity situation of un-
employed workers not only directly through transfers during unemployment, but also indirectly
by changing the worker's precautionary saving behavior prior to job loss. In standard, asset-
12Shimer and Werning (2008) also discuss a dual role of UI with a slightly dierent focus.
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independent UI systems, public transfers have an ambiguous eect on the liquidity situation,
because any increase in the generosity of UI will crowd out precautionary savings. Systems with
asset-increasing UI benets, however, implicitly raise the rate of return on assets and thereby
enhance precautionary savings while keeping the average generosity of transfers unchanged.
This generates extra liquidity via private asset accumulation without changing the average level
of benets, which means that the eects on publicly provided liquidity and moral hazard both
average out to zero, loosely speaking.
Moreover, if we look at the dynamic distribution of moral hazard eects, we nd that asset-
increasing UI benets have some additional desirable properties. As long as agents accumulate
assets during employment and decrease assets during unemployment, assets are a summary
statistic of the agent's employment history, where an high asset stock signals short (and/or
infrequent) periods of unemployment. Asset-increasing UI benets therefore have the feature
that benets decrease with the duration of present and past unemployment spells, which is com-
monly found to be optimal in the dynamic contracting literature; see Shavell and Weiss (1979),
and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009). Furthermore, the magnitude of asset accumulation and
decumulation tends to be larger in systems with asset-increasing benets, so that consumption
during employment decreases more strongly with the duration of previous unemployment spells.
Hence, UI systems with asset-increasing benets create more signicant `re-employment taxes'
in the sense of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). In these two ways asset-increasing UI benets
emulate the dynamics of constrained ecient allocations, which complements the eciency gain
resulting from improved liquidity provision.
Finally, by raising the steady state asset stock, asset-increasing UI systems generate extra
interest income, compare Table 4, so that a part of the welfare change results simply from higher
mean income. For instance, when comparing the benchmark economy to the economy with
optimal linear asset-dependent benets, we observe that the change in the asset stock generates
additional interest income equivalent to approximately 0:6 percent of period consumption, while
the total welfare gain amounts to 1:34 percent of period consumption.
For a conclusive welfare analysis, the steady state eects discussed above have to be com-
pared to the costs of reaching the new steady state. The following two sections show that the
welfare gains of asset-increasing UI systems need to be corrected downwards when the transi-
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tion phase is taken into account. Yet, transition eects will not invalidate the basic insight that
optimal UI benets are increasing in individual asset holdings.
4.1 A simple transition experiment
To approximate the consequences of an optimal transition, we suppose throughout this section
that the government can arbitrarily change the asset distribution at the time of a policy reform
using individual specic lump-sum transfers. There are many possible ways to design those
transfers, however, in terms of the costs they are all identical: if mean assets in the pre-reform
steady state are given by aold and mean assets in the post-reform steady state are anew, then
the lump-sum transfers can be nanced by the government by repaying r(anew   aold) in every
period. We add this cost or revenue to the government's budget constraint and keep the budget
balanced by adjusting UI benets accordingly.
In this experiment, the economy immediately jumps from the pre-reform steady state to
the post-reform steady state. Yet, the costs of changing the asset stock are taken into account,
because they enter the government's budget and are repaid over the future. Using this approach,
the welfare eects of policies that raise the steady state asset distribution will be corrected
downwards. Table 6 displays mean asset holdings, unemployment, taxes and welfare changes
for various asset-independent UI systems taking into account the transition costs outlined above.
For asset-independent systems, we nd that the optimal replacement rate coincides with the
benchmark rate of 50 percent.
Table 7 considers UI benets that are linear in assets. Conrming the results from Section
3.2, we nd that welfare is increasing in the slope of UI benets even when the transition costs
described above are included. Since part of the tax revenue is used to nance the change in
the steady state asset stock, the benet functions from Section 3.2 are no longer feasible. The
highest possible slope of benets is now given by 1 = 0:12, and leads to a welfare gain of 0:79
percent of period consumption.13
13By contrast, when the costs of the lump-sum transfers to change the capital stock are ignored (as in Section
3.2), the intercept of the benet function with slope 1 = 0:12 can be increased from 2 = 0:08 to a level of
2 = 0:20. At the same time, the welfare gain rises to 1:09 percent of consumption.
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Table 6: Steady states for various asset-independent replacement rates. Transition costs as
outlined in Section 4.1 are included.
replacement assets unemployment tax welfare change
80% 0.73 6.2% 3.8% -0.27%
70% 0.84 5.8% 3.1% -0.10%
60% 0.98 5.4% 2.6% -0.02%
50% 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
40% 1.31 4.8% 1.7% -0.03%
30% 1.52 4.6% 1.3% -0.10%
20% 1.77 4.4% 1.0% -0.20%
Notes: In this transition experiment, the government immediately moves the economy to the post-reform
steady state using individual specic lump sum transfers. The costs or revenues of these transfers enter
the government's budget and are repaid over the future.
Table 7: Steady states for linear asset-dependent replacement rates. Transition costs as out-
lined in Section 4.1 are included.
1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
-0.150 0.658 0.51 4.8% -0.71%
-0.100 0.621 0.67 4.9% -0.49%
-0.050 0.571 0.87 5.0% -0.26%
0.000 0.500 1.13 5.1% 0.00%
0.050 0.394 1.51 5.2% 0.30%
0.100 0.210 2.16 5.4% 0.64%
0.120 0.081 2.62 5.5% 0.79%
Notes: In this transition experiment, the government immediately moves the economy to the post-
reform steady state using individual specic lump sum transfers. The costs or revenues of these transfers
enter the government's budget and are repaid over the future. The tax rate  = 0:0211 is xed at the
benchmark level.
4.2 An explicit transition phase
If we rule out individual specic lump-sum transfers, the steady state asset distribution induced
by a policy reform cannot be implemented instantaneously. It will thus take some time before
individual saving decisions have moved the asset distribution to its new steady state.
The simplest way of modeling an explicit transition would be to posit that the UI reform is
not anticipated and takes eect immediately at the time it is announced. For the introduction
of asset-increasing benets, however, this would be the worst possible approach. During the
transition phase, agents would not only have to give up consumption to build a higher asset
stock, they would also face very little insurance against unemployment. For instance, at the
linear UI policy that maximizes steady state welfare in Section 3.2, the replacement rate at
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average pre-reform asset holdings amounts to little more than 20 percent and so it would take
a signicant amount of time before the agent is reasonably well insured against unemployment.
Indeed, if we perform this exercise, we nd that the steady state welfare gain of 1:34 percent
of consumption transforms into a welfare loss of 1:31 percent when taking the transition phase
into account.14
To compensate for the lack of insurance during the transition phase, we allow the government
to pay a common transfer to all agents at the time of the policy reform. This transfer is nanced
by the cost savings of the UI program during the transition phase and by a slight increase in
the tax rate. Table 8 presents the results of this experiment for the optimal linear UI policy
from Section 3.2. Recall that average steady state asset holdings rise from 1:1 to 2:8 under that
reform. As Table 8 shows, the policy reform yields a welfare gain if the initial transfer is at
least 0:9 or, in other words, if roughly half of the change in steady state assets is paid as an
initial transfer.
Table 8: Linear asset-dependent replacement rates with initial transfers. Welfare includes the
transition phase.
1 2 initial transfer tax welfare change
0.138 0.08 0.28 2.11% -1.31%
0.138 0.08 0.50 2.19% -0.83%
0.138 0.08 0.89 2.33% 0.00%
0.138 0.08 1.00 2.37% 0.23%
0.138 0.08 1.50 2.56% 1.21%
Notes: In this experiment, the government pays a common one-time transfer to all agents when intro-
ducing the optimal linear UI policy from Section 3.2.
Alternatively, underinsurance during the transition phase can be avoided by introducing
asset-increasing benets on top of the benchmark system. In that case, asset-increasing UI
systems actually improve welfare without requiring any initial transfer. More specically, we
carry out the following exercise. We set the intercept of the benet function to 2 = 0:5 and
then explore dierent values for the slope 1. At the same time, we adjust the tax rate to
keep the government budget balanced (in present value terms, including budget eects of the
transition). As usual, we assume that agents do not anticipate the policy reform until it takes
eect. The results of this experiment are shown in Table 9. We see that asset-increasing UI
14The transition phase generates a budget surplus for the government, since benet payments during the
transition are lower than in the new steady state. We neutralize this by paying an initial transfer of 0:28 to all
agents.
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systems improve welfare by a consumption equivalent variation of up to 0:12 percent.Dierent
from the experiments in Section 3.2, welfare is no longer monotonic in the slope parameter 1,
because higher slopes now require higher taxes and higher average benets. The tax and benet
levels therefore become ineciently high when slopes are too steep.
Table 9: Linear asset-dependent replacement rates. Welfare includes the transition phase.
1 2 assets unemployment tax welfare change
0.000 0.50 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
0.025 0.50 1.22 5.3% 2.3% 0.08%
0.050 0.50 1.33 5.6% 2.5% 0.12%
0.075 0.50 1.48 6.0% 2.9% 0.11%
0.100 0.50 1.71 6.7% 3.5% -0.07%
Notes: The replacement rate is bounded below by fty percent for all asset levels. In other words,
asset-increasing benets are introduced on top of the benchmark UI system.
Finally, we would like to remark that there are several alternative ways of limiting the
harm of the transition phase when an asset-increasing UI policy is introduced. For instance,
one could announce the introduction of such policy a number of years in advance. This would
give agents the opportunity to accumulate assets while the benchmark UI system is still in
place, which is certainly much more sensible than the introduction of an asset-dependent policy
without advance notice.15 Another option would be to pay extra transfers to agents who become
unemployed shortly after the policy reform.
4.3 Heterogeneous discount factors
In its basic version, the model generates less asset heterogeneity among job losers than we nd in
the data documented by Gruber (2001). In fact, a larger degree of heterogeneity might change
the case in favor of asset-decreasing benets, because then transfers targeted to agents with
very low liquidity might possibly become more important. To see how our results change with
more asset heterogeneity, we follow the approach by Krusell and Smith (1998) and generate a
larger variation in the asset distribution using heterogeneous time discount factors.
Throughout this section, we explore a version of the model in which agents have a discount
factor  2 f1; 2; 3g. The share of agents with discount factor i equals one third for i = 1; 2; 3.
Discount factors are permanent. We recalibrate the parameters of the model to match the
15The agent's decision function loses its stationarity during such a transition, which creates challenging com-
putational problems.
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targets from Section 3 as well as the 25th and 75th percentile of gross nancial assets of job
losers reported by Gruber (2001).16 This gives parameters of EE = 0:9855,  = 0:062,  = 2,
 = 1, 1 = 0:922, 2 = 0:978, 3 = 0:996. As usual, we choose the tax rate  to obtain budget
balance. This results in  = 0:0209.
With heterogeneous preferences, the denition of a welfare measure becomes less straight-
forward. For simplicity, we aggregate welfare using equal weights for all types. Since period
utilities include the factor (1  i) by construction, the rst best allocation is the same across
groups. Hence, preference heterogeneity per se does not create a motive for redistribution.
Qualitatively, the ndings from Section 3 generalize to the model with heterogeneous dis-
count factors and the resulting higher heterogeneity in assets. In particular, UI benets that
increase with assets continue to be optimal. However, the welfare gain of asset-dependent UI
systems becomes somewhat smaller. We also nd that concave benet functions are far more
benecial than linear ones. Intuitively, by making the benets concave in assets, we can reduce
the degree of redistribution from asset-poor agents to asset-rich agents, but maintain the feature
that asset accumulation is implicitly subsidized.
The optimal nonlinear asset-dependent policy of the form (7) is given by parameters (1; 2) =
(0:8; 7:737) and creates a steady state welfare gain of 1.14 percent in consumption equivalent
terms. If we take into account the costs of building up the higher asset stock, the optimal pa-
rameters are (1; 2) = (0:3; 40:414), and the welfare gain is 0.30 percent. This policy is highly
concave in assets. The replacement rate is 0.08 for agents with no assets, 0.34 for agents with
assets of 1, and 0.39 for agents with assets of 2, for instance.
4.4 Comparison of results to other quantitative papers
To the best of our knowledge, there is no other quantitative assessment of asset testing in the
unemployment insurance literature. In terms of the setup, however, our basic model is related
to the works by Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (2002).
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) explore optimal asset-independent UI in a framework where
job oers are not observable and, as in the present paper, agents have access to a savings
technology subject to liquidity constraints. They nd that, depending on the degree of moral
16According to Gruber (2001), the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the asset distribution of job losers are
given by asset holdings of 0.1, 1.2 and 7.8, respectively.
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hazard, the optimal replacement rate varies between 15 and 65 percent. The present paper
nds an optimal asset-independent replacement rate of 40 percent, see Section 3.1, which falls
into the range calculated by Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992). Instead of varying the degree of
moral hazard exogenously, we calibrate our model to match empirical ndings on the elasticity
of the job nding rate with respect to UI benets.
Our basic model also has similarities with the setup from Wang and Williamson (2002).
Yet, we follow a very dierent calibration strategy. In particular, we use empirical results on
asset holdings of job losers as the target for the discount factor, whereas Wang and Williamson
(2002) choose a discount factor in line with the real business cycle literature, which results in
asset holdings that are about ve times larger. It comes as no surprise that the welfare eects
of UI are much bigger in the present paper. For instance, relative to autarky the benchmark
UI system raises welfare by a consumption equivalent variation of 0.64 percent in our model,
whereas Wang and Williamson (2002) nd welfare gains of only 0.09 percent. Moreover, the
behavioral responses to changes in the replacement rate are stronger in the present paper. In
our model, the unemployment rate in autarky is 34 percent lower than under the benchmark
UI system, whereas it falls by only 9 percent in the setup from Wang and Williamson (2002).
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the question whether UI benets should depend on individual asset holdings.
We explore this question in a quantitative model where agents face moral hazard during job
search and accumulate a risk-free asset for self-insurance. We nd that the optimal UI program
is one where benets are an increasing function of assets. Intuitively, since liquidity concerns are
crucial for unemployed workers, and since public transfers generally exacerbate moral hazard,
it is expedient to encourage precautionary saving rather than to punish it. In addition, asset-
increasing benets emulate key features of the dynamics of constrained ecient allocations.
Since the asset stock is a summary statistic of the employment history where high assets signal
short unemployment spells, a system where benets increase with assets rewards histories that
are linked to high job search eort in the past.
Two nal remarks seem appropriate. First, it is important to keep in mind that all jobs are
identical in our model. Our results should thus be interpreted in the sense that the optimal UI
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replacement rate is an increasing function of assets, not that the absolute level of benets is
increasing with assets.
Second, in practice assets are observable for the UI agency at a cost only. Even though a
precise estimate of this cost seems dicult to obtain, we are condent that the benet quite
plausibly outweighs the cost for two reasons. First of all, the welfare gain of conditioning UI
on assets is substantial and exceeds even the gain of moving the economy from autarky to the
benchmark UI system. Second, under the optimal asset-dependent UI policy agents have no
incentive to underreport assets, but only to overreport, which is probably easier to detect.
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A Asset-dependent benets for alternative tax rates
This section explores nonlinear asset-dependent UI benets when taxes are set to various levels.
Table 10 displays the steady states that result when the parameters for the nonlinear benet
function are chosen optimally given the tax rate. We see that welfare is highest when the tax
rate is at the benchmark level,  = 0:0211.
B Asset-dependent benets for alternative social assistance sys-
tems
In the benchmark calibration, we set social assistance benets to 8 percent of after-tax labor
income, in line with replacement rates for long-term unemployment in the United States. In
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Table 10: Steady states for nonlinear asset-dependent replacement rates. The parameters of
the benet function are chosen optimally given the tax rate.
taxes 1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
1.00% 2.6 5.396 3.00 5.2% 1.20%
2.11% 2.0 4.815 3.48 6.5% 1.56%
3.00% 1.8 4.258 3.57 7.4% 1.34%
5.00% 2.0 3.457 3.64 9.5% 0.14%
this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results with respect to changes in the social
assistance system.17 We set social assistance benets to z = 0:15(1  )w and re-calibrate the
time discount factor  and the eciency parameter  for job search to match median asset
holdings of job losers and the average job nding rate as in the benchmark model. Since the
preference parameters  and  are chosen to match targets related to unemployment, and since
these statistics remain almost unchanged, we refrain from recalibrating these parameters.18 We
then explore the introduction of nonlinear asset-dependent UI benets. We start from the
benchmark economy with a replacement rate of 50 percent and, as before, we x the budget
balancing tax rate from this economy,  = 0:0218, across all experiments. Two welfare measures
are considered. First, we compare steady state welfare. Second, we take into account the costs
of changing the steady state asset stock, compare Section 4.1. Table 11 presents the optimal
policies for the dierent experiments.
Table 11: Welfare eects of asset-dependent benets for high social assistance benets
transition costs 1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
no 2.1 4.974 3.40 6.2% 1.38%
yes 2.2 5.290 2.97 5.5% 0.67%
The results in Table 11 are derived using re-calibrated parameters, so they are not directly
comparable to the benchmark economy. Nonetheless, the results show that the welfare gains
of asset-increasing benet systems in the benchmark calibration do not stem from the low
replacement rate during social assistance. Given that job nding rates in the social assistance
state are particularly high, which implies that only a very small fraction of the population is in
this highly transitory state, this nding should not be surprising.19 However, we consider this
17We also explored the eect of extending the duration of unemployment benets to innity. Results changed
only slightly and are available upon request.
18In the calibration,  changes from 0:0472 in the benchmark case to 0:0528 and  changes from 0:974 in the
benchmark case to 0:9794.
19In the benchmark economy 1:2 percent of agents are in the social assistance state.
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an important robustness check of our results.
In a further step, we also explored optimal asset-independent UI systems when social as-
sistance benets are at the level z = 0:15(1   )w. Without transition costs, the optimal UI
replacement rate is about 30 percent, whereas it remains at 50 percent if the transition costs to
the new steady state are taken into account. In any case, the benchmark replacement rate of
50 percent remains approximately optimal, since the welfare changes stay below 0:03 percent
of consumption.
C Figures
Figure 1: Benchmark economy (replacement rate 0.5)
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Notes: The upper left panel shows the consumption policy as a function of assets. The upper right panel
shows job nding rates as a function of assets. The lower panel displays the asset distribution. In all
three plots the red solid line represents employed workers, the blue dashed line represents unemployed
workers who receive UI benets, and the green dashed dotted line represents unemployed workers who
receive social assistance benets.
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Figure 2: Optimal linear asset-dependent UI system
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ts
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(b) rate of return on assets
Notes: The left panel shows the after-tax wage for the employed (red solid line), unemployment insurance
benets (blue dashed line), and social assistance benets (green dashed dotted line). The right panel
shows the technological interest rate (red solid line) and the implied total interest rate (red dashed line)
for employed agents when taking the marginal eect of assets on unemployment benets into account.
Figure 3: Optimal linear asset-dependent UI system
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nding probability
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Notes: The upper left panel shows the consumption policy as a function of assets. The upper right panel
shows job nding rates as a function of assets. The lower panel displays the asset distribution. In all
three plots the red solid line represents employed workers, the blue dashed line represents unemployed
workers who receive UI benets, and the green dashed dotted line represents unemployed workers who
receive social assistance benets.
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Figure 4: Optimal nonlinear asset-dependent UI system
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Notes: The left panel shows the after-tax wage for the employed (red solid line), unemployment insurance
benets (blue dashed line), and social assistance benets (green dashed dotted line). The right panel
shows the technological interest rate (red solid line) and the implied total interest rate (red dashed line)
for employed agents when taking the marginal eect of assets on unemployment benets into account.
Figure 5: Optimal nonlinear asset-dependent UI system
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Notes: The left panel shows the after-tax wage for the employed (red solid line), unemployment insurance
benets (blue dashed line), and social assistance benets (green dashed dotted line). The right panel
shows the technological interest rate (red solid line) and the eective interest rate (red dashed line) for
employed agents in this economy.
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